First VPN dismantled in Operation Saffron: law enforcement disrupts infrastructure used by 25 ransomware groups
European and North American authorities have shut down First VPN, a criminal VPN service that facilitated ransomware attacks, data theft, and DDoS operations for approximately 25 ransomware groups. The coordinated takedown represents a significant disruption to organised cybercrime infrastructure, though similar services remain operational.
Affected
Operation Saffron represents a rare but significant success in disrupting the operational infrastructure supporting major ransomware campaigns. The takedown of First VPN strikes at the anonymity layer that criminal actors depend on to obscure command-and-control communications, reconnaissance activities, and data exfiltration. Rather than targeting vulnerabilities in victim systems or specific malware families, this operation addressed the enabling infrastructure, which is a higher-order intervention point.
The involvement of 25 ransomware groups using a single VPN service indicates substantial centralisation within the cybercriminal ecosystem. This concentration risk created an attractive enforcement target: dismantling one service disrupts a large network of actors simultaneously. The fact that First VPN facilitated ransomware attacks, data theft, reconnaissance scanning, and denial-of-service operations demonstrates it functioned as a multipurpose anonymity service rather than a legitimate privacy tool, making the legal and operational case for takedown straightforward.
Defenders should recognise that such disruptions are typically temporary rather than transformative. Criminal actors will migrate to alternative VPN services, proxy networks, or other anonymity infrastructure within weeks. The operational friction imposed by migration may slow certain campaigns, but well-resourced ransomware groups maintain redundant infrastructure and relationships with multiple providers. The more significant impact will be felt by less sophisticated threat actors who cannot rapidly adapt.
This operation also highlights the sustained commitment of French and Dutch law enforcement to ransomware disruption, reflecting a broader trend of European-led cybercriminal investigations. The international coordination required for such operations remains resource-intensive, limiting the frequency with which infrastructure takedowns can occur. Organisations should use this disruption window to patch systems, review access logs for indicators of compromise, and strengthen monitoring for actors seeking alternative command infrastructure.
The longer-term implication is that criminal VPN services remain sufficiently profitable and tolerated by certain hosting providers to persist despite enforcement attention. Sustained pressure on upstream providers, financial networks, and DNS infrastructure would likely prove more effective than targeting individual services.
Sources