Bypass of Allowlist/Blocklist in zeptoclaw via Command Injection

The vulnerability arises from insufficient validation of shell commands in zeptoclaw. The allowlist only checks the first token of a command, allowing attackers to bypass restrictions using command injection techniques like ; or $(). Additionally, argument injection can circumvent regex-based block patterns, and file name wildcards can bypass literal block patterns. This flaw enables arbitrary command execution, undermining the project's security controls.

The PoC demonstrates that even in 'Strict' mode, zeptoclaw's security measures are ineffective against well-crafted attacks. It highlights the importance of comprehensive validation beyond just the first token and underscores the risks of relying solely on allowlist/blocklist mechanisms without thorough sanitization.

Defenders should implement strict command validation, use reliable shell parsing libraries, and monitor for unusual command patterns. Log analysis should look for unexpected commands or arguments matching known attack vectors. Network-based detection can include signatures targeting common injection techniques.

To fix this, update the allowlist to validate all command tokens, not just the first one. Use robust shell parsing libraries that handle wildcards and special characters properly. Strengthen block patterns by applying regex checks to all arguments and implement additional sanitization for file operations.

The likelihood of exploitation is high due to the simplicity of the attack vectors. Threat actors with knowledge of this flaw could exploit it to gain unauthorized access or execute malicious commands, posing significant risks to systems using zeptoclaw.